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Abstract—Vehicular cloud computing has emerged as a promising solution to fulfill users’ demands on processing computation-intensive
applications in modern driving environments. Such applications are commonly represented by graphs consisting of components and edges.
However, encouraging vehicles to share resources poses significant challenges owing to users’ selfishness. In this paper, an auction-based graph
job allocation problem is studied in vehicular cloud-assisted networks considering resource reutilization. Our goal is to map each buyer (component)
to a feasible seller (virtual machine) while maximizing the buyers’ utility-of-service, which concerns the execution time and commission cost. First,
we formulate the auction-based graph job allocation as an integer programming (IP) problem. Then, a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves based payment rule is
proposed which satisfies the desired economical properties, truthfulness and individual rationality. We face two challenges: 1) the above-mentioned
IP problem is NP-hard; 2) one constraint associated with the IP problem poses addressing the subgraph isomorphism problem. Thus, obtaining
the optimal solution is practically infeasible in large-scale networks. Motivated by which, we develop a structure-preserved matching algorithm by
maximizing the utility-of-service-gain, and the corresponding payment rule which offers economical properties and low computation complexity.
Extensive simulations demonstrate that the proposed algorithm outperforms the benchmark methods considering various problem sizes.
Index Terms—Vehicular cloud-assisted networks, truthful auction, graph job allocation, subgraph isomorphism.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rapid growth of connected devices in Inter-net of things (IoT) networks, especially smart cars,
the Internet of vehicles (IoV) has become an emerging
paradigm that offers safety, convenience, and entertainment
for both drivers and passengers. Furthermore, technologi-
cal advances in computing processors and sensing devices
has offered innovative solutions for vehicular applications
with resource hungry features. Such applications include
face/behavior identification, simultaneous localization and
mapping, autonomous driving, and advanced driver as-
sistants, all of which require massive computational re-
sources [1], [2]. Notably, graph-based representation is uti-
lized to characterize the non-negligible internal structures
of such applications. In such scenarios, each application (the
“application” is interchangeable with “job” or “graph job”
throughout) is modeled as a graph, where the vertices (com-
ponents) represent either data sources or data processing
units, while the edges describe the dependency between the
vertices [3].
However, the limitation of a single smart vehicle caused
by resource and capability constraints of on-board equip-
ment, may hinder the fulfillment of graph job execution
requirements. One approach is to process such applications
on remote data centers or mobile edge computing (MEC)
servers [4]–[6]. Nonetheless, the former may incur enor-
mous costs due to bulk data transfer and latency, while
the limited resource as well as signal coverage of MEC
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servers may cause unsatisfactory offloading performance.
Thus, vehicular cloud computing (VCC) [2], [7] has been
proposed to provide flexible and effective computing ser-
vices for the users (called job owners, JOs). In VCC plat-
form, vehicles with surplus resources act as servers (called
service providers, SPs) to form vehicular clouds (VCs) via
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications, which enables the
processing of jobs in parallel. We summarize two major
challenges facing the allocation of graph jobs over VCs:
1) Obtaining the feasible mappings between the components
of the jobs and the SPs while satisfying the heterogeneous
computational demands of the components requires solving
the subgraph isomorphism problem, which is known to be
NP-complete.
2) Avoiding behaviors that sellers may misreport their bids
while motivating the selfish SPs to lease their idle resources
is a major challenge, since reporting untruthful bid may
potentially lead to a higher profit for the SPs.
Addressing the aforementioned challenges is the main
motivation of this paper. We propose innovative policies
for a marketplace considering resource reutilization. The
proposed framework comprises three participants: sellers
(service providers), buyers (service requestors), and the
broker that manages the acution while offering the de-
sired economical properties of truthfulness and individual
rationality [8]. We investigate an auction mechanism for
graph job allocation, where each JO has a job modeled
as an undirected weighted graph of components (buyers)
with different demands for execution time. A virtual ma-
chine (VM)-based [9] representation is utilized to quantize
available resources of SPs. Also, the VC is abstracted to an
undirected weighted graph consisting of VMs (sellers) that
can be reutilized after release, where sellers can provide
heterogeneous computational capabilities. To maximize the
sum of the utility-of-service, an optimal and a sub-optimal
algorithm together with the relevant payment rules are pro-
2posed to map each buyer to a feasible seller. The mapping
ensures that the requirements of the graph job execution are
met, and also provides truthfulness as well as individual
rationality as two key desired market properties.
1.1 Related work
There existing works devoted to studying the computation-
intensive job allocation that can be roughly divided into
two categories: a) allocation of bit stream-represented jobs
without considering the inherent dependencies, such as [5],
[6], [10]–[13]; and b) allocation of graph-represented jobs
upon existence of inner dependencies among the compo-
nents, which is also the main focus of this paper, such as [3],
[14]–[19]. Moreover, the environment in which the graph job
allocation is studied can be divided into three types based
on the dynamism of the network topology: static, semi-
static, and dynamic. By assuming the static topologies for
both the servers and the users, authors in [14] proposed
a randomized job scheduling algorithm that stabilizes a
systemwith job arrivals/departures and facilitates a smooth
trade-off between the minimization of the average execution
cost and the servers’ queue length. In semi-static environ-
ment where the topologies of either the computing servers
or the service requestors are fixed, a novel framework
for energy-efficient graph job allocation in geo-distributed
cloud networks was introduced in [3], where solutions
are obtained for data center networks considering various
scales. A lyapunov optimization-based dynamic offloading
approach is developed in [15] to satisfy the constraints on
energy conservation and application execution time. The
scheduling of parallel jobs composed of a set of independent
tasks was studied in [16] by mainly considering energy
consumption and job completion time. In [17], a VC-based
computation offloading mechanism was introduced which
enabled tasks being executed in different vehicles to mini-
mize the overall response time while enhancing the capacity
of the edge clouds. The graph job allocation problem in
dynamic network environments have rarely been studied. In
such networks, the mobility of servers and users as well as
interdependency of the components pose major challenges
to the design of applicable allocation methods. We were
among the few working on addressing such challenges. A
randomized job allocation mechanism based on hierarchical
tree decomposition was proposed in our previous work [18],
which efficiently solves the allocation problem considering
the trade-off between the task completion time and data
exchange cost among the SPs. In [19], we investigated the
multi-graph-task offloading problem while considering the
potential competition among components caused by the
concurrency of multiple tasks.
However, economical factors and incentive issues related
to the graph job allocation haven’t been fully addressed
in the above-mentioned works. Auctions have been widely
applied and regarded as a popular trading form for effec-
tive price discovery and resource sharing among the users.
For the semi-static network environments (e.g., [20]–[24]),
authors in [20] proposed two double auction schemes with
dynamic pricing to determine the matched pairs between
industrial-IoT mobile devices and edge servers. In [21], a
stochastic offloading approach in mobile cloud computing
through online auctionwas presentedwhile achieving desir-
able economic properties such as truthfulness and individ-
ual rationality. A truthful double auction mechanism was
proposed in [22] to bridge users’ task requirements and
providers’ resources in two-sided cloud markets. In [23],
the authors modeled the VM resource allocation prob-
lem among edge clouds and mobile users as an n-to-one
weighted bipartite graph matching problem with 0-1 knap-
sack constraints, and then designed a greedy approximation
algorithm to solve the problem. Authors in [24] focused on
vehicular fog computing (VFC) environment based on smart
parking, where a VFC-aware parking reservation auction
was proposed to guide the on-the-move vehicles to the
available parking places with less effort and exploite the
computing services of the parked vehicles to assist the
delay-sensitive tasks. In the dynamic environment, authors
in [7] proposed different truthful auction models for homo-
geneous and heterogeneous task models (e.g., tasks with
the same and different resource requirements). In [25], a
distributed auction model was investigated to facilitate the
resource trading between the owner of the tasks and the
mobile devices participating in task execution. However,
the above mentioned auction-based works maily focused
on the bit stream-represented jobs, and thus the inherent
interdependencies among the components of the jobs has
not been fully considered.
1.2 Novelty and Contribution
In existing literature concerned with the semi-static or dy-
namic network environment, addressing the job allocation
problem under graph-based representation while applying
auction theory are rarely investigated. Moreover, the cocept
of resource reutilization allowing the usage of a VM after its
release is neglected in most of the above-mentioned works,
which offers more options to buyers. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is among the first which proposes a
truthful auction model for the graph job allocation problem
over VCs while considering resource reutilization. The main
contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We establish a novel VC-assisted graph job allocation
marketplace which enables multiple computation-
intensive graph jobs to be mapped (offloaded) to the
SPs, while considering the reutilization of resources.
• We propose an auction-based graph job allocation
mechanism, where the components of jobs are acted
as buyers with various demands. Sellers are defined
by considering VM reutilization with heterogeneous
capabilities. To achieve the maximum total utility-
of-service of the buyers, we formulate the graph job
allocation as an integer programming (IP) problem
under limited opportunistic communications, which
is NP-hard. Moreover, one of the constraints related
to preserving the graph job structures requires ad-
dressing the subgraph isomorphism problem. We
tailor a VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG)-based payment
rule to protect the benefits of the sellers, prevent
misreporting behaviors, and achieve individual ra-
tionality.
• To tackle the IP problem for obtaing a feasible map-
ping between the buyers and the sellers, we first
develop an optimal algorithm to find the graph job
allocation solution while guaranteeing truthfulness
and individual rationality from different perspec-
tives of the SPs, the VMs and the sellers. We show
that this method suffers from a high computational
3complexity, which makes it ineffective when encoun-
tering a large number of jobs and SPs or upon having
complicated job and network topology.
• To obtain a near optimal solution for the proposed IP
problem in polynomial time, we propose a structure-
preserved matching algorithm based on maximizing
the utility-of-service-gain and its corresponding pay-
ment rule. We demonstrate that the low computa-
tional complexity of this method makes it a good fit
for large and fast-changing IoV networks. Moreover,
we prove that the proposed method enjoys desirable
economic properties of truthfulness and individual
rationality.
• Based on thorough numerical analysis and compar-
ative evaluations, we demonstrate that the perfor-
mance of the proposed low complexity structure-
preserved matching algorithm can approach that of
the optimal algorithm, while outperforming baseline
methods considering various problem sizes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. System
model and design targets are introduced in Section 2. We
formulate the IP problem and propose an adequate VCG-
based payment rule in Section 3. This section also contains
the proofs of the desired economical properties and the
related optimal graph job allocation algorithm. In Section 4,
a structure-preserved matching algorithm based on utility-
of-service-gain maximization is proposed. The conomical
properties are also proved to be true in the same sec-
tion. The performance evaluation through comprehensive
simulations is conducted in Section 5 before drawing the
conclusion in Section 6.
2 SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN TARGETS
In the following, we mainly study the problem in one
VC for tractable analysis, since the proposed auction-based
graph job allocation mechanism is universal across all VCs.
Consider a VC containsing |O| JOs and |S| SPs and several
RSUs alongside the road. Note that the data size of resulting
feedback of the job execution is much smaller than that
TABLE 1
Major notations
Notation Explanation
O,S UAV set, SP set
GOn ,V On ,EOn ,WOn graph job, set of components, set of edges,
and set of weights of On
Gs,V s,Es,W s graph structure, set of sellers, set of edges,
and set of weights of VC
n, x the index of JO and buyer, respectively
m, y, n the index of SP, VM and seller, respectively
B, D the bidding matrix, the demand matrix
K, K∗ the binary matrix, the optimal solution
bn,x buyer (the xth component of GOn )
tn,x the tolerable execution time of bn,x
Sm, vm,y SP, the yth VM of Sm
sm,y,r seller (the rth seller related to vm,y of Sm )
cm,y,r the computational capability of seller sm,y,r
pm,y,r, qm,y,r the bid and true price of seller sm,y,r
g
n,x
m,y,r the time saved by mapping bn,x to sm,y,r
κ
n,x
m,y,r the binary indicater that represents
the mapping between bn,x and sm,y,r
ROn the set of sellers coveraged by On
Ln,x,LBro the preference list of bn,x and the broker
s˜i,j,k the seller located behind si,j,k in
buyer’s preference list
g˜
n,x
i,j,k
, p˜i,j,k the execution time saved when mapping
bn,x to s˜i,j,k , the bid of s˜i,j,k
of the application data [4], alternatively, results can be
transferred back to the JO via a multi-hop V2V routing path
or uploaded to RSUs for future delivery in case the V2V
connection is disrupted, and thus neglected in this paper.
The framework of the proposed auction for VC-assisted
graph job allocation is shown in Fig. 1(a), and the main
notations are summarized in TABLE 1. The related models
in this paper are introduced hereafter.
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Fig. 1. (a) The framework of the proposed auction for VC-assisted graph job allocation; (b) Example of possible solutions of graph job allocation.
42.1 Opportunistic contact model
A contact event between vehicles n andm occurs during τ ∈
(τ1, τ2) when ‖Ln(τ1)− Lm(τ1)‖ > R, ‖Ln(τ) − Lm(τ)‖ ≤
R and ‖Ln(τ2) − Lm(τ2)‖ > R, where Ln(τ) and Lm(τ)
denote the respective locations, ‖·‖ represents the Euclidean
distance, and R indicates the communication radius of the
vehicles. Generally, the contact duration among the vehicles
obeys an exponential distribution [26], [27] with parameter
λn,m; thus, the probability of the contact duration ∆τn,m
between two vehicles n and m being larger than T is given
by prob(∆τn,m > T |λn,m) = e
−Tλn,m . Correspondingly,
the larger the value of prob(∆τn,m > T |λn,m) is, the more
insurance can be achieved to protect data interaction among
the respective vehicles.
2.2 Modeling the buyers
Consider a set of JOs O, where each JO On ∈ O
owns a graph job GOn =
(
V On ,EOn ,WOn
)
that contains a set of components V On ={
bn,x|n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |O|} , x ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , |V On |
}}
where
each component bn,x is associated with a tolerable
execution time tn,x (seconds); and a set of edges E
On ={
eOnxx′|x, x
′ ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , |V On |
}
, x 6= x′
}
with associated
weight WOn =
{
ωOnxx′ |x, x
′ ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , |V On |
}
, x 6= x′
}
.
In this model, the edges represent data flows among the
components and the weight ωOnxx′ of edge e
On
xx′ indicates the
requested connect duration for intermediate data exchange
between components bn,x and bn,x′ , which is considered to
be equal to or lower than the smaller tolerable execution
time of the two. Also, the contact duration of the SPs that
handle components bn,x and bn,x′ should be ideally equal
to or larger than ωOnxx′ . A job G
On represents how the
computation is supposed to be splitted among components
in V On . In this paper, each component bn,x ∈ V
On is seen
as a buyer and mapped to an available seller in the related
VC, by paying a certain commission for the computing
service.
2.3 Modeling the sellers
We use a VM-based presentation to describe the available
resources of the SPs. In this case, each SP Sm ∈ S has
a collection of VMs V Mm =
{
vm,1, . . . , vm,|V Mm|
}
that
are fully connected (namely, can communicate continuously
with each other), where vm,y denotes the yth VM on Sm.
Moreover, vm,y can provide the computational capability of
cm,y (seconds) that is the execution time of processing one
component of a graph job. The VM reutilization factor en-
ables each VM vm,y to serve more than one buyer after every
cm,y (seconds); namely, to cover multiple buyers, vm,y can
process a buyer after the completion of the previous buyers.
Thus, each VM vm,y is modeled as a collection of virtual
sellers svm,y = {sm,y,r|r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r˜m,y}}, where sm,y,r
refers to the rth virtual seller derived from VM vm,y , that
can provide the computational capability cm,y,r = r × cm,y
for processing one buyer. Notably, the value of r˜m,y × cm,y
should be equal to or less than the maximum demand
among buyers. For notational simplicity, we use seller as the
substitution of “virtual seller” for indicating each sm,y,r.
Fig. 1(b) shows a scenario of a graph job with three
components (3 buyers), and a VC containing three SPs (SP1
has 2 VMs/5 sellers, SP2 has 1 VM/2 sellers, SP3 has 1
VM/4 sellers). Notably, the maximum tolerable execution
time among buyers is 3 seconds. Take VM v1,2 (the second
VM on the first SP) which provides c1,2 = 0.8 seconds
for processing one component as an example. Considering
VM reutilization (r˜1,2 = 3), v1,2 can be divided into three
sellers s1,2,1, s1,2,2, s1,2,3 with computational capabilities of
c1,2,1 = 1×0.8 = 0.8 seconds, c1,2,2 = 2×0.8 = 1.6 seconds
and c1,2,3 = 3 × 0.8 = 2.4 seconds, respectively. Fig.
1(b) also depicts several feasible solutions of mapping the
buyers to the sellers. For instance, in Solution 1, buyers b1,1,
b1,2, and b1,3 are mapped to sellers s1,2,1, s2,1,1, and s2,1,2,
respectively.
2.4 Modeling the VC
In a VC, we assume that each JO can communicate
with at least one SP via one-hop V2V communication.
It is assumed that the JOs are under pressure from
insufficient local resources so that they prefer to integrate
resources from the SPs in the related VC; thus, we
do not consider the VMs on the JOs as available
resources. Consequently, a VC is represented as graph
Gs = (V s,Es,W s) containing a set of sellers V s ={
sm,y,r|Sm ∈ S, vm,y ∈ V Mm, sm,y,r ∈ s
vm,y
}
; edge set
Es =
{
em,y,rm′,y′,r′ |sm,y,r, sm′,y′,r′ ∈ V
s, sm,y,r 6= sm′,y′,r′
}
,
where each edge em,y,rm′,y′,r′
indicates that seller sm,y,r can communi-
cate with sm′,y′,r′ ; and weight set W
s ={
λm,y,rm′,y′,r′|sm,y,r, sm′,y′,r′ ∈ V
s, sm,y,r 6= sm′,y′,r′
}
related
to edges. Notably, sellers of the same SP are fully connected
which brings λm,y,rm′,y′,r′ = 0 when m = m
′; otherwise,
λm,y,rm′,y′,r′ = λm,m′ , which refers to the exponential
distribution parameter of the contact duration between the
vehicles.
2.5 The broker
A broker acts as an intermediate agent or auctioneer who
hosts and directs auction processes. In this paper, the edge
computing server can conduct auctions as a broker [7].
2.6 The economic model
In our proposed auction-based framework for graph job
allocation, each seller sm,y,r has a bid pm,y,r which denotes
the reported price for processing one component and offers
a computational capability cm,y,r. Also, it has a true valua-
tion qm,y,r
1 that is unknown to the broker, the buyers, and
the other SPs. The true price qm,y,r of seller sm,y,r is defined
as a monotone decreasing function of cm,y,r as (1),
qm,y,r = U
S (cm,y,r) . (1)
US denotes a monotone decreasing function, where a lower
execution time cm,y,r leads to a higher price owing to a more
powerful computational capability that sm,y,r can provide.
To prevent misreporting behavior where pm,y,r 6= qm,y,r,
the mechanism proposed in this paper enjoys truthfulness
that incentivizes sellers to provide the bidding information
as the true valuation (i.e., pm,y,r = qm,y,r) by ensuring no
additional benefits and possible risks brought by misreport-
ing.
1. The “true price” and “true valuation” are utilized interchangeably
for the rest of this paper.
5The gross utility gn,xm,y,r of buyer bn,x is defined as the
time saved by enjoying the computing service of seller
sm,y,r, defined as (2).
gn,xm,y,r = tn,x − cm,y,r (2)
The gross utility that each seller offers to buyers is non-
identical, where the larger value of gn,xm,y,r represents that
buyer bn,x can save more time on execution.
Based on (1) and (2), the utility-of-service (UoS) of each
buyer bn,x is defined as the utility each buyer can get after
paying for the computing service, which can be calculated
as αng
n,x
m,y,r−pm,y,r, where αn denotes the sensitivity factor
between price and execution time of On. The VM reutiliza-
tion can effectively handle various buyers with different
preferences related to various prices and execution times
the the sellers can provide. Thus, a buyer with a lower
sensitivity on execution time can wait for the release of an
applicable VM by enjoying a discounted price.
2.7 Design targets
In this paper, truthfulness and individual rationality are
considered as key design targets [25], [28], which are for-
mally defined below.
Definition 1 (Truthfulness): An auction is truthful if every
seller keeps his bid equal to his true valuation. Sellers in
a truthful auction marketplace are not willing to take any
risks that may have bad effects on their utilities.
Definition 2 (Individual rationality): An auction is indi-
vidually rational if all the bidders are guaranteed to receive
non-negative utilities.
Our proposed framework includes the following main
steps (see Fig. 1(a)): first, the buyers publish their demands
(e.g., the tolerable execution time) and the sellers provide
their bids. Then, applicable allocation solutions can be de-
termined by the broker and transfered to all the partici-
pants. Note that any feasible allocation should consider the
structural characteristics of the jobs and the VC. Aiming
to maximize the total UoS of buyers while protecting the
sellers’ benefits, each buyer is matched to a seller under the
constraints of opportunistic communications and available
resources.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION AND THE OPTIMAL
ALGORITHM
This section first presents the problem formulation, and the
corresponding payment rule. Then, an optimal algorithm is
proposed for distributing graph jobs over VCs.
3.1 Problem formulation
Let the binary indicator κn,xm,y,r represents the
assignment of buyer bn,x to seller sm,y,r, where
κn,xm,y,r = 1 when buyer bn,x is mapped to sm,y,r, and
κn,xm,y,r = 0, otherwise. For notational simplicity, let
K =
[
κn,xm,y,r
]
sm,y,r∈V s,1≤n≤|O|,1≤x≤|V on |
denote the
corresponding binary matrix. Given the bidding matrix
of sellers B = [pm,y,r]sm,y,r∈V s and the demand matrix
of buyers D = [tn,x]1≤n≤|O|,1≤x≤|V on |, we fomulate the
graph job allocation as an integer programming problem P
given in (4), aiming to maximize the total UoS of buyers
F(K) shown in (3).
F(K) =
|S|∑
m=1
|O|∑
n=1
|V Mm|∑
y=1
|V on |∑
x=1
r˜m,y∑
r=1
(
αng
n,x
m,y,r − pm,y,r
)
κn,xm,y,r
(3)
P : K∗ = argmax
K
F (K) (4)
s.t.
κn,xm,y,r , 0, if Sm /∈ Ron or tn,x < cm,y,r or
(
αng
n,x
m,y,r − pm,y,r
)
≤ 0, (C1)
e−λmm′×ω
On
xx′ ≥ ε, ∀eOnxx′ ∈ E
on , if m 6= m′ and κn,xm,y,r · κ
n,x′
m′,y′,r′ = 1, (C2)
|S|∑
m=1
|V Mm|∑
y=1
r˜m,y∑
r=1
κn,xm,y,r = 1, ∀bn,x, 1 ≤ n ≤ |O|, 1 ≤ x ≤ |V
on |, (C3)
|O|∑
n=1
|V on |∑
x=1
κn,xm,y,r ≤ 1, ∀sm,y,r, 1 ≤ m ≤ |S|, 1 ≤ y ≤ |V Mm|, 1 ≤ r ≤ r˜m,y, (C4)
Notation Sm ∈ ROn indicates that Sm is located within the
communication range of On. In problem P , constraint (C1)
ensures one-hop V2V job allocation from JOs to SPs where
buyer bn,x is mapped to a seller that meets the requirement
on the tolerable execution time tn,x and positive UoS, and
thus guarantees the successful execution of components.
Constraint (C2) represents a probabilistic constraint which
ensures that if two connected buyers bn,x and bn,x′ are
assigned to two sellers belonging to two different SPs Sm
and Sm′ , the probability of the contact duration between
Sm and Sm′ being larger than ω
on
xx′ must be greater than
the threshold ε ∈ (0, 1]. Also, (C2) relies on addressing
the subgraph isomorphism problem, to preserve the graph
job structures during auction. Constraint (C3) and (C4)
guarantee the one-to-one mapping between the buyers and
the sellers. Concretely, they guarantee that each buyer can
only be mapped to one seller, and each seller can process no
more than one buyer.
63.2 The VCG-based payment rule
Having the above defined IP problem, we use a VCG-
based [28] payment rule given in (5), where the payment
of a winning seller si,j,k depends on the damage it causes
to other participants, which is calculated as the difference
between the optimal value of the objective function with
and without seller si,j,k.
Pi,j,k = F(K
∗)− FV s\{si,j,k}(Θ
∗)
+ pi,j,k × κ
n,x ∗
i,j,k , (5)
where F(K∗) denotes the maximum value of func-
tion (3). Also, FV s\{si,j,k}(Θ
∗) indicates the maximum
value of (3) without the participation of seller si,j,k,
where the relevant optimal solution is represented by
Θ
∗ =
[
θn,x ∗m,y,r
]
sm,y,r 6=si,j,k
.
3.3 Analysis of truthfulness and individual rationality
Proposition 1 (Truthfulness): Given the payment rule in (5),
every seller si,j,k ∈ V
s in the proposed auction is willing to
have the bid equal to his true valuation (pi,j,k = qi,j,k).
Proof. Under a given bidding matrix of other sellers in the
related VC, consider two cases for seller si,j,k as follows,
Case 1: si,j,k has his bid pi,j,k equal to the true valuation
qi,j,k (pi,j,k = qi,j,k), and the corresponding utility ui,j,k is
calculated as below based on the payment rule shown in (5),
ui,j,k = Pi,j,k − qi,j,k × κ
n,x ∗
i,j,k
= F(K∗)−FV s\{si,j,k}(Θ
∗). (6)
Case 2: si,j,k misreports his bid denoted as p
′
i,j,k (p
′
i,j,k 6=
qi,j,k), and the corresponding net utility is calculated in
(7), in which K∗′ =
[
κn,x ∗′m,y,r
]
sm,y,r∈V s,1≤n≤|O|,1≤X≤|V On |
denotes the graph job allocation solution when si,j,k misre-
ports his bid, and κn,x ∗′i,j,k indicates the relevant assignment
of si,j,k.
u′i,j,k = P
′
i,j,k − qi,j,k × κ
n,x ∗′
i,j,k
= F(K∗′)−FV s\{si,j,k}(Θ
∗)
+ p′i,j,k × κ
n,x ∗′
i,j,k − qi,j,k × κ
n,x ∗′
i,j,k (7)
The difference between the utilities of the above men-
tioned two cases is calculated in (8).
ui,j,k − u
′
i,j,k = F(K
∗)−F(K∗′)
− p′i,j,k × κ
n,x ∗′
i,j,k + qi,j,k × κ
n,x ∗′
i,j,k . (8)
According to (3), we have
F(K∗) =
|S|∑
m=1
|O|∑
n=1
|V Mm|∑
y=1
|V on |∑
x=1
r˜m,y∑
r=1(
αng
n,x
m,y,r − pm,y,r
)
× κn,x ∗m,y,r, (9)
and
F(K∗′) =
|S|∑
m=1
|O|∑
n=1
|V Mm|∑
y=1
|V on |∑
x=1
r˜m,y∑
r=1
αng
n,x
m,y,r × κ
n,x ∗′
m,y,r
−
|S|∑
m=1
|O|∑
n=1
|V Mm|∑
y=1
|V on |∑
x=1
r˜m,y∑
r=1
pm,y,r × κ
n,x ∗′
m,y,r
− p′i,j,k × κ
n,x ∗′
i,j,k + qi,j,k × κ
n,x ∗′
i,j,k . (10)
Correspondingly, (8) can be calculated as (11).
ui,j,k − u
′
i,j,k =
|S|∑
m=1
|O|∑
n=1
|V Mm|∑
y=1
|V on |∑
x=1
r˜m,y∑
r=1
(
αng
n,x
m,y,r − pm,y,r
)
× κn,x ∗m,y,r −
|S|∑
m=1
|O|∑
n=1
|V Mm|∑
y=1
|V on |∑
x=1
r˜m,y∑
r=1
αng
n,x
m,y,r × κ
n,x ∗′
m,y,r+
|S|∑
m=1
|O|∑
n=1
|V Mm|∑
y=1
|V on |∑
x=1
r˜m,y∑
r=1
pm,y,r × κ
n,x ∗′
m,y,r + p
′
i,j,k × κ
n,x ∗′
i,j,k − qi,j,k × κ
n,x ∗′
i,j,k − p
′
i,j,k × κ
n,x ∗′
i,j,k + qi,j,k × κ
n,x ∗′
i,j,k
=
|S|∑
m=1
|O|∑
n=1
|V Mm|∑
y=1
|V on |∑
x=1
r˜m,y∑
r=1
(
αng
n,x
m,y,r − pm,y,r
)
× κn,x ∗m,y,r −
|S|∑
m=1
|O|∑
n=1
|V Mm|∑
y=1
|V on |∑
x=1
r˜m,y∑
r=1
(
αng
n,x
m,y,r − pm,y,r
)
× κn,x ∗′m,y,r . (11)
Apparently in (11), solution κn,x ∗′m,y,r is included in the solu-
tion space of the graph job allocation problem. Owing to that
κn,x ∗m,y,r represents the optimal solution which is always equal
to or better than other solutions, we have ui,j,k − u
′
i,j,k ≥ 0
and sellers do not obtain better utilities by misreporting in
the auction. In other words, sellers will always report their
true valuations.
Proposition 2 (Individual rationality of the sellers): Given
the payment rule in (5), every seller si,j,k ∈ V
s in the
proposed auction are individual rational, in other words,
sellers will not be in worse positions after participation.
Proof. Given that the auction is truthful and the payment
rule defined in (5), the utility of a winning seller si,j,k
is calculated as (6), where κn,x ∗m,y,r and θ
n,x ∗
m,y,r indicate the
optimal allocation of cases with and without si,j,k. For
notational simplicity, V s
′
, V s\{si,j,k} denotes the sellers
set without si,j,k, we consider the following two cases:
Case 1: F(K∗) ≥ FV s′ (Θ
∗). According to (5), the utility
ui,j,k of seller si,j,k is greater than or equal to zero. Conse-
quently, si,j,k will get non-negative benefit after participa-
tion.
Case 2: F(K∗) < FV s′ (Θ
∗). Given that V s
′
⊆ V s, the
solution space over set V s
′
is a subset of that over V s, and
thus the value of F(K∗) is always equal to or larger than
FV s′ (Θ
∗). Consequently, Case 2 will never happen.
In conclusion, all sellers in the auction have the property
of individual rationality.
Proposition 3 (Individual rationality of VMs): All VMs are
7Algorithm 1: The optimal algorithm for the auction-based graph job allocation
Input : graph jobs GOn = {V On ,EOn ,WOn}, VC graph Gs = {V s,Es,W s}, B,D
Output: the optimal solution K∗, the related payments Pi,j,k of the winning sellers
1 // Stage 1: The buyer-seller pair selection procedure
2 Initialization:B∗ ← {V O1 ∪ V O2 · · · ∪ V O|O|}, MatchT ← [], K∗ ← [], b← length(B∗), s← length(V s),
3 Bbuyer ← {Bbuyeri |i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , b!}, |B
buyer
i | = b}; % each sequence B
buyer
i denotes a permutation of the
elements in B∗
4 S∗ ← {Ssellerj |j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C(s, b)}, |S
seller
j | = b,S
seller
j ⊆ V
s}, % each sequence Ssellerj denotes a permutation
of b elements in V s
5 for i = 1 to b! do
6 for j = 1 to C(s, b) do
7 if a buyer in B
buyer
i can be mapped to a seller in S
seller
j while meeting constraints (C1) and (C2) then
8 Kij ← {B
buyer
i ,S
seller
j }, MatchT ←MatchT ∪Kij ,
9 else
10 Kij ← [],
11 K∗ ← the solution with maximum value of (3) in MatchT , % the optimal matching between the buyers and sellers
12 // Stage 2: Payment calculation for winning sellers
13 for si,j,k ∈ V
s and κn,xi,j,k = 1 do
14 calculate Pi,j,k according to the payment rule (5),
15 end algorithm
willing to take part in the proposed auction scheme.
Proof. A VM is divided into multiple sellers with different
capabilities owing to the resource reutilization factor con-
sidered in this paper. According to (6), the utility of a VM
vi,j participates in the auction is thus calculated as:
ui,j =
r˜i,j∑
k=1
Pi,j,k −
r˜i,j∑
k=1
qi,j,k × κ
n,x ∗
i,j,k
= F(K∗)×
r˜i,j∑
k=1
κn,x ∗i,j,k −
r˜i,j∑
k=1
FV s\{si,j,k}(Θ
∗)
+
r˜i,j∑
k=1
pi,j,k × κ
n,x ∗
i,j,k −
r˜i,j∑
k=1
qi,j,k × κ
n,x ∗
i,j,k (12)
Given that all the sellers are truthful, we have:
ui,j = F(K
∗)×
r˜i,j∑
k=1
κn,x ∗i,j,k −
r˜i,j∑
k=1
FV s\{si,j,k}(Θ
∗). (13)
Notably, when VM vi,j does not take part in the auc-
tion, all sellers si,j,k ∈ s
vi,j will accordingly exit the
auction, which brings FV s\{si,j,k}(Θ
∗) , FV s\svi,j (Θ
∗∗).
V s\svi,j denotes the set of sellers when VM vi,j does not
take part in the auction (all sellers of VM vi,j are excluded)
and Θ∗∗ = [θn,x ∗∗m,y,r ]vm,y 6=vi,j
is the corresponding optimal
solution. Thus, (13) can be rewrote as:
ui,j =
(
F(K∗)−FV s\svi,j (Θ
∗∗)
)
×
r˜i,j∑
k=1
κn,x ∗i,j,k . (14)
Since K∗ stands for the optimal solution over set V s,
we have F(K∗) ≥ FV s\svi,j (Θ
∗∗) which brings ui,j ≥ 0.
Thus, all the VMs are willing to participate in the proposed
auction scheme.
Proposition 4 (Individual rationality of SPs): All SPs are
willing to take part in the proposed auction.
Proof. The utility ui of SP Si can be calculated as:
ui =
|V Mi|∑
j=1
ui,j . (15)
According to Proposition 3, we have ui ≥ 0. Thus, all
SPs in this auction are individual rational.
3.4 The optimal graph job allocation
Our proposed optimal algorithm that matches each buyer
to a feasible seller, proceeds in two stages, the pseudo-code
of which is given in Algorithm 1. In stage 1, the best graph
job allocation solution is obtained by exhaustive search and
comparisons of the values of (3). Then, in stage 2, the pay-
ment of each winning seller is calculated according to (5),
which guarantees the truthfulness. Specifically inAlgorithm
1, lines 2-4 stands for the initialization procedure; in lines
5-10 we search for the possible mapping set MatchT ,
wherein each mapping Kij denotes the assignments from
the buyer set to a feasible seller set; line 11 selects the best
mappingwith themaximum value of the total UoS of buyers
given by (3); lines 13-14 in stage 2 we calculate the payments
for the winning sellers.
Algorithm 1 solves the NP-hard problem given in (4).
Moreover, the constraint (C2) of (4) relies on addressing the
subgraph isomorphism problem, which is also challenging
to be solved [3], [18]. Specially, obtaining the optimal so-
lution requires computation complexity of O (b!× C (s, b)),
where b =
∑|O|
n=1 |V
On | and s = |V s| denotes the total
number of buyers and sellers in the related VC, respectively.
Symbol “!” is used as the factorial notation and C(s, b)
stands for the s− choose − b operation. Due to that jobs are
modeled as undirected graphs where components (buyers)
do not have a particular execution sequence. Moreover, the
calculation of the payments of the winning sellers leads
8to the computational complexity of O (b× b!× C (s, b)).
Thus, a broker can hardly obtain the solution for larger-
scale and real-life networks with the inreasing number of
buyers and sellers. In consequence, a structure-preserved
matching algorithm is proposed in the next section to solve
the problem in polynomial time complexity, while achieving
the maximization of the utility-of-service-gain (UoSG).
4 THE STRUCTURE-PRESERVED MATCHING AL-
GORITHM BASED ON UOSG MAXIMIZATION
We propose a structure-preserved matching algorithm
based on UoSG maximization (hereafter, we also use “Max-
UoSG” for notational simplicity) as an efficient way to solve
the graph job allocation problem in VC-assisted networks.
Specifically, UoSG is defined as the profit a VC can obtain
after matching one pair of buyer and seller. We later demon-
strate that our proposed method enjoys truthfulness and
individual rationality properties.
4.1 The proposed structure-preserved matching based
on UoSG maximization
For notational simplicity, we define vn,xm,y,r ,(
αng
n,x
m,y,r − pm,y,r
)
. We also define the preference lists
from the perspectives of both buyers and the broker to
identify the buyer-seller pairs that may bring more gains to
the total UoS of the buyers. Notably, if seller sm,y,r is out
of the communication coverage of buyer bn,x or it makes
the value of
(
αng
n,x
m,y,r − pm,y,r
)
less than zero, it will not
be included in both buyer’s and broker’s preference lists
so as to prevent non-positive UoS. For bn,x ∈ V
On , the
preference list Ln,x is defined as (16) sorted by the value of
vn,xm,y,r in a non-ascending order.
Ln,x :
(
1, bn,x, sm,y,r, v
n,x
m,y,r
)
≻bn,x . . .
≻bn,x
(
˜|Rbn,x |+ 1, bn,x, sbn,x , vbn,x
)
, (16)
where ˜|Rbn,x | denotes a number that meets 0 <
˜|Rbn,x | ≤
|Rbn,x |. Each item in the above list is represented by a
tetrad that contains index in the list, a buyer, a seller and
the corresponding vn,xm,y,r, symbol ≻bn,x represents the pref-
erence relation, where the seller on the left-side of “≻bn,x”
can bring more benefit to buyer bn,x as compared to all
the sellers on the right-side. To ensure the property of
truthfulness, a virtual seller sbn,x is added to the end of
the list Ln,x as a critical indicator with the critical UoS
vbn,x ,
(
αng˜
n,x
i,j,k − p˜i,j,k
)
be slightly lower than the values
of all UoS in the list. The relevant proofs of economical
properties will be given in Section 4.3.
The broker’s preference list given by (17) is regarded as
a union set of all Ln,x excluding the virtual sellers, sorted
by non-ascending order of the value of vn,xm,y,r, where the
mapping between a buyer and a seller on the left-side of
“≻broker” can bring higher benefit to the buyers as com-
pared to those on the right-side. An example of preference
lists of buyers and the broker is shown in Fig. 2.
LBro :
(
1, bn,x, sm,y,r, v
n,x
m,y,r
)
≻broker(
2, bn′,x′ , sm′,y′,r′ , v
n′,x′
m′,y′,r′
)
≻broker · · · (17)
The proposedMaxUoSG contains the job allocation stage
and the payment decision stage. The preference list LBro
will be mainly referred to in the former stage aiming
to maximize the total UoS. Notably, this might sacrifice
some buyers’ benefits. For instance,
(
1, bn,x, si,j,k, v
n,x
i,j,k
)
and
(
1, bn′,x′ , si,j,k, v
n′,x′
i,j,k
)
located at the top of Ln,x and
Ln′,x′ respectively; however, the broker is inclined to match
bn,x to si,j,k since
(
αng
n,x
i,j,k − pi,j,k
)
>
(
αn′g
n′,x′
i,j,k − pi,j,k
)
.
Then, lists of the buyers Ln,x are used to calculate the
payments for winning sellers.
Preference list of 
buyer b1,1
(1, b1,1, s1,1,1, 2.5)
(2, b1,1, s2,1,1, 2.1)
(3, b1,1, s1,1,2, 1.7)
(4, b1,1, s2,1,2, 0.5)
S1
S2
s1,1,1
s1,1,2
s2,1,1
s2,1,2
O1
O2
1s
b1,1
b2,1
Preference list of 
buyer b2,1
(1, b2,1, s1,1,1, 4.0)
(2, b2,1, s1,1,2, 3.2)
(3, b2,1, s2,1,2, 0.5)
(4, b2,1, s2,1,1, 0.1)
Preference list of 
the broker 
(1, b2,1, s1,1,1, 4.0)
(2, b2,1, s1,1,2, 3.2)
(3, b1,1, s1,1,1, 2.5)
(4, b1,1, s2,1,1, 2.1)
(5, b1,1, s1,1,2, 1.7)
(6, b1,1, s2,1,2, 0.5)
(7, b2,1, s2,1,2, 0.5)
(8, b2,1, s2,1,1, 0.1)VC
Fig. 2. Example of the preference lists of buyers and the broker.
4.2 The related payment rule
For notational simplicity, let s˜i,j,k be the first seller located
behind si,j,k in list Ln,x. We define the payment of a
winning seller si,j,k as
P#i,j,k =
(
αng
n,x
i,j,k −
(
αng˜
n,x
i,j,k − p˜i,j,k
))
× κn,x #i,j,k , (18)
where g˜n,xi,j,k = tn,x − c˜i,j,k denotes the benefit of buyer bn,x
from enjoying the computing service of seller s˜i,j,k. Symbol
c˜i,j,k and p˜i,j,k represents the execution time and the bid
of s˜i,j,k, respectively. In (18), κ
n,x #
i,j,k indicates the obtained
solution via the proposed MaxUoSG algorithm.
The pseudo-code of the proposedMaxUoSG algorithm is
given in Algorithm 2. The notationMatchT stands for the
match table that stores all the successfully matched buyer-
seller pairs, andKsub denotes the final graph job allocation
solution. In stage 1 (lines 1-24), a mapping between the
buyers and the winning sellers are obtained according to
LBro, while taking into account the graph job structures.
In stage 2 (lines 25-27), the payment of each winning seller
is calculated based on the buyer’s preference list. More pre-
cisely, lines 2-4 correspond to the initialization procedure.
Lines 5-13 search for feasible buyer-seller pairs from the top
of list LBro, while meeting the structure-preservation and
one-to-one matching constraints. For the former constraint,
the structure of each graph job has to be preserved, while the
later constraint requires that the buyers and sellers that are
in currentMatchT should be ignored during the matching
procedure. Lines 14-15 stand for the successful matching
where all the buyers are mapped to the feasible sellers. Lines
16-19 correspond to the case in which no feasible buyer-
seller pairs can be chosen after the first item of LBro, restart
the matching procedure from the second item in list LBro.
In lines 20-21, we delete the last successful matching pair in
9Algorithm 2: The structure-preserved matching algorithm based on UoSG maximization
Input : graph jobs GOn = {V On ,EOn ,WOn}, VC graph Gs = {V s,Es,W s}, B,D, Ln,x, LBro
Output: the sub-optimal solution Ksub, the related payments P#i,j,k of the winning sellers
1 // Stage 1: The buyer-seller pair selection procedure
2 Initialization:B∗ ← {V O1 ∪ V O2 · · · ∪ V O|O|}, S∗ ← V s, b← length(B∗), s← length(S∗), L← length(LBro),
3 Ksub ← [], MatchT ← [], indT ry ← 0, indMatch← 1,
4 MatchT ← the first item in LBro, % add the first item of LBro to MatchT
5 while the index of the last item in MatchT ≤ L and indT ry ≤ L do
6 for indT ry = (indMacth+ 1) to L do
7 if the buyer-seller pair of index indT ry in LBro is not in MatchT then
8 MTemp← the item with index indT ry in LBro,
9 TempB ← the buyer in MTemp, % save the relevant buyer
10 TempS ← the seller in MTemp, % save the relevant seller
11 if match TempB to TempS can meet constraints (C1) and (C2), and prevent the interdependency with buyers
and sellers in MatchT then
12 MatchT ←MTemp ∪MatchT , % add the new buyer-seller pair to MatchT
13 indMatch← the index of the last item in MatchT , % update indMatch
14 if the number of buyers in MatchT == b then
15 go to stage 2, % if all the buyers are successfully mapped to the sellers, go to stage 2 (line 26)
16 if the number of buyers in MatchT < b and indMatch < L and indT ry == L then
17 if the number of buyers in MatchT == 1 then
18 indMatch← the index of the first item in MatchT + 1, % restart the matching procedure from the
second item in LBro
19 the first item in MatchT ← the item with indMatch in LBro,
20 else
21 the last item in MatchT ← [], % delete the last successful matching pair in MatchT and keep
searching from the next item of which in LBro
22 if the number of buyers in MatchT < b and indMatch == L and indT ry == L then
23 go to line 28,
24 Ksub ← all buyer-seller pairs in MatchT , % a feasible matching between the buyers and the sellers
25 // Stage 2: Payment calculation for winning sellers
26 for si,j,k ∈ V
s and κn,xi,j,k = 1 do
27 calculate P#i,j,k according to the payment rule in (18),
28 end algorithm
MatchT and keep searching from the next item located be-
hind the deleted item in LBro, if the matching procedure is
blocked by an infeasible buyer-seller pair (e.g, a buyer-seller
pair that cannot meet the structure-preservation constraint).
Lines 22-23 correspond to the failure of matching. In stage
2, lines 26-27 calculate the payment for every winning seller
according to the proposed payment rule shown in (18).
The proposed algorithm enables low computation com-
plexity when solving the auction-based graph job alloca-
tion problem. For buyers’ preference list generations, bub-
ble sort is applied that brings a computation complex-
ity of O
(
|R˜bn,x |
2
)
for each buyer. As for LBro, merge
sort algorithm is utilized with computation complexity of
O (L× log (L)), where L = |LBro| denotes the number of
items in LBro. The proposed structure-preserved matching
provides the best computation complexity performance of
O(b) and the worst case complexity of O((L − b)× b).
4.3 Analysis of truthfulness and individual rationality
Proposition 5 (Truthfulness): The proposed MaxUoSG al-
gorithm makes each seller, i.e., si,j,k ∈ V
s set its bid equal
to the true valuation, i.e., pi,j,k = qi,j,k.
Proof. Due to the structure-preservation factor, any changes
to the broker’s preference list may have a great impact
on the final matching solution. Therefore, two cases are
considered: Case 1) the misreporting behavior of a seller
causes no change to the orders of items in LBro; and Case
2) the misreporting behavior of a seller causes changes to
the orders of items in LBro. The utility ui,j,k of a winning
seller si,j,k when pi,j,k = qi,j,k, is given by:
ui,j,k = P
#
i,j,k − qi,j,k × κ
n,x #
i,j,k (19)
A virtual seller s′i,j,k is considered owning the same
properties with seller si,j,k, except for the untruthful bid
p′i,j,k 6= qi,j,k, which denotes the case where seller si,j,k
misreports in the auction. The utility of s′i,j,k is given by:
u′i,j,k = P
#′
i,j,k − qi,j,k × κ
n,x #′
i,j,k , (20)
where κn,x #′i,j,k is the graph job allocation solution via the
proposed algorithm when si,j,k misreports its bid. Based
on the aforementioned utilities, the proof of truthfulness
is presented based on the above mentioned two cases.
For Case 1, consider the following conditions:
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Case 1.1 (p′i,j,k < qi,j,k). If s
′
i,j,k wins the auction, the
utility can be calculated as:
u′i,j,k =
(
αng
n,x
i,j,k
′
−
(
αng˜
n,x ′
i,j,k − p˜
′
i,j,k
)
− qi,j,k
)
× κn,x #′i,j,k ,
(21)
where gn,x ′i,j,k and g˜
n,x ′
i,j,k denote the buyer bn,x’s benefit ob-
tained from virtual seller s′i,j,k and the first seller located
after s′i,j,k in list Ln,x, respectively. Similarly, if si,j,k wins
the auction, we get the utility:
ui,j,k =
(
αng
n,x
i,j,k −
(
αng˜
n,x
i,j,k − p˜i,j,k
)
− qi,j,k
)
× κn,x #i,j,k ,
(22)
When p′i,j,k < qi,j,k, s
′
i,j,k is always located before
si,j,k in each buyer’s preference list, which lead to(
αng˜
n,x ′
i,j,k − p˜
′
i,j,k
)
≥
(
αng˜
n,x
i,j,k − p˜i,j,k
)
and ui,j,k≥ u
′
i,j,k.
Consequently, s′i,j,k will never be mapped to bn,x owing
to the same properties with si,j,k except for the bid. Thus,
bidding truthfully will always lead to more utility.
Case 1.2 (p′i,j,k > qi,j,k). It is obvious that si,j,k will be
located before s′i,j,k in each buyer’s preference list.
Case 1.2.1: si,j,k and s
′
i,j,k are located adjacently with each
other in list Ln,x. Here, we have u
′
i,j,k = ui,j,k since s˜
′
i,j,k
is the only critical indicator. Thus, si,j,k does not have to
misreport his bid in the auction.
Case 1.2.2: There is a seller s˜i,j,k located between si,j,k and
s′i,j,k in list Ln,x. Here, if s
′
i,j,k wins the auction, s˜i,j,k will
also win the auction. Due to the one-to-one mapping rule
between buyers and sellers in the proposed auction, we
have u′i,j,k = 0.
To meet the requirement of structure-preservation, a
seller who misreports bid faces the following risks in Case
2.
Risk 2.1: the structure-preservation constraint may bring a
seller s′i,j,k with failure in this auction even when p
′
i,j,k >
qi,j,k, which leads to u
′
i,j,k = 0.
Risk 2.2: the structure-preservation constraint leads to an
equal utility for an untruthful seller s′i,j,k, i.e., u
′
i,j,k = ui,j,k,
when
(
αng˜
n,x ′
i,j,k − p˜
′
i,j,k
)
=
(
αng˜
n,x
i,j,k − p˜i,j,k
)
.
Risk 2.3: the structure-preservation constraint leads to
an non-positive utility for an untruthful seller s′i,j,k, if
αng
n,x ′
i,j,k −
(
αn
˜gn,x ′i,j,k − p˜
′
i,j,k
)
< 0, which leads to u′i,j,k < 0.
Notably, misreporting behavior may bring an untruthful
seller a higher utility in Case 2 (examples are detailed in
simulation). However, a seller has no idea how to adjust
its bid to aviod the above mentioned risks while insuring a
higher utility, owing to the non-transparent information in
the proposed marketplace (e.g., the opportunistic V2V com-
munication duration among different SPs, and the required
weights ωOnxx′ among buyers of each graph job).
Consequently, in Case 2, being truthful stands for a
risk-free option for each seller. In general, the proposed
MaxUoSG algorithm offers truthfulness in this auction mar-
ketplace.
Proposition 6 (Individual rationality of the sellers): All
the sellers in the proposed auction scheme are individual
rational via the proposed MaxUoSG algorithm.
Proof. Given that seller si,j,k bids truthfully and si˜,j,k is the
seller located behind si,j,k in the preference list of bn,x, we
have:
αng
n,x
i,j,k − pi,j,k ≥ αng˜
n,x
i,j,k − p˜i,j,k, (23)
which leads to
αng
n,x
i,j,k − αng˜
n,x
i,j,k + p˜i,j,k ≥ pi,j,k (24)
Combining (22) with (24), we have ui,j,k ≥ 0. Thus, all
the sellers in the proposed auction scheme have the property
of individual rationality.
Proposition 7 (Individual rationality of VMs and SPs): All
SPs and VMs are willing to take part in the proposed auction
scheme via the proposed MaxUoSG algorithm.
Proof. For each VM vi,j ∈ V M i and SP Si ∈ S, we
calculate the utility of which as ui,j =
∑r˜i,j
k=1 ui,j,k, and
ui =
∑|V Mi|
j=1 ui,j , respectively. According to Proposition
6, we have ui,j ≥ 0 and ui ≥ 0. In conclusion, all SPs
and VMs are willing to participate in the proposed auction
scheme.
5 NUMERICAL RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
Closed triad
(Type 1)
Square
(Type 2)
Bull graph
(Type 3)
Double-star graph
(Type 4)
Component in graph job (Buyer) Edge between components
Fig. 3. Graph job types considered in simulation [3].
Fig. 4. Running time performance of the optimal and the proposed
MaxUoSG algorithm considering various number of buyers and sellers.
This section presents numerical results, illustrating the
validity of the proposed algorithms. In the following, the
performance of the optimal algorithm (“Opt”) and the
structure-preserved matching algorithm based on UoSG
maximization (“MaxUoSG”) comparing with the baseline
methods, are analyzed in detail. Moreover, various problem
sizes are investigated with different numbers of buyers
and sellers. Baseline methods and the related procedures
considered in the simulation are given below:
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Fig. 5. Performance evaluation of the total UoS in small problem size scenarios, where the title of each sub-figure denotes the related graph job
type(s).
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 6. Performance evaluation of the total UoS in large problem size scenarios, where the title of each sub-figure denotes the related graph job
type(s).
1) Execution time preferred mechanism (ETPM): Ran-
domly select a buyer and match it to the seller with the
current lowest execution time, while satisfying constraints
(C1) and (C2), until all the buyers are mapped to the sellers
successfully.
2) Low price preferred mechanism (LPM): Randomly select
a buyer and match it to the seller with the current lowest
price, while satisfying constraints (C1) and (C2), until all the
buyers are mapped to the sellers successfully.
3) Random matching mechanism (RMM): Randomly select
a buyer and randomly match it to an available seller, while
satisfying constraints (C1) and (C2), until all the buyers are
mapped to the sellers successfully.
5.1 Simulation setup
Graph job structures considered in the simulation are de-
picted in Fig. 3. A monotone decreasing function formed by
US(cm,y,r) = β2 − β1cm,y,r is applied to determine the true
valuation qm,y,r of each seller, where β1 and β2 are positive
constants (β1 ∈ [0.7, 0.9], β2 ∈ [0.9, 1]) which enables a
higher true valuation of a more powerful seller. The simula-
tion parameters are randomly obtained from the following
intervals: ε ∈ [0.9, 0.95], αn ∈ [1, 1.5], cm,y ∈ [0.2, 0.3],
tn,x ∈ [0.6, 0.7], ω
on
xx′ ∈ [0.1, 0.7], and λmm′ ∈ [0.05, 0.06]
for small problem sizes with a couple of JOs and SPs and
λmm′ ∈ [0.01, 0.02] for large problem sizes with more
participants.
5.2 Running time performance
The running time performance comparison between the
optimal algorithm and the proposed MaxUoSG is shown
in Fig. 4, for various numbers of SPs/sellers and different
job types depicted in Fig. 3. Notably, 10-based logarithm
representation is applied since the gap between the running
time of the two algorithms becomes too large as the graph
job and VC structures become more complicated (e.g., by
increasing the number of buyers and sellers). Compared
with the proposed MaxUoSG, Fig. 4 indicates that as the
number of buyers and sellers in a VC grows, the running
time of obtaining the optimal solutions rises sharply, while
that of the proposed MaxUoSG remains at a certain order
of magnitude of 10−2 seconds, which makes the optimal
algorithm unsuitable for fast-changing and large-scale net-
works. Moreover, different topological complexity of VC
configurations (e.g., existence of more sellers and edges
in VC graph) may also lead to a dramatic change in the
running time. Specifically, obtaining the optimal solution
takes more than 2× 104 seconds upon allocating a job with
type 4 and four SPs (37 sellers), as shown in Fig. 4.
5.3 The obtained UoS in various problem sizes
The comparisons of the sum of the UoS (the value of the
objective function (3)) between the baseline methods, the
optimal, and the MaxUoSG algorithms for various graph job
types are shown in Fig. 5 for small problem size scenarios
with a couple of buyers and sellers. Fig. 5(a), Fig. 5(b),
Fig. 5(c) and Fig. 5(d) reveal that the proposed MaxUoSG
exhibits the same or similar performance with the optimal
algorithm, and outperforms the baseline methods RMM,
ETPM and LPM upon allocating one graph job. Similarly,
upon allocating two graph jobs, Fig. 5(e), Fig. 5(f), Fig. 5(g)
and Fig. 5(h) demonstrate that the proposed MaxUoSG
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TABLE 2
The average performance improvement of the proposed MaxUoSG compared to the baseline methods obtained from Fig. 5 and Fig. 6.
Baselines
Figures
Fig. 5(a) Fig. 5(b) Fig. 5(c) Fig. 5(d) Fig. 5(e) Fig. 5(f) Fig. 5(g) Fig. 5(h) Fig. 6(a) Fig. 6(b) Fig. 6(c) Fig. 6(d)
RMM 74.96% 90.18% 101.95% 90.85% 21.38% 95.27% 68.11% 141.67% 97.73% 61.62% 111.70% 64.07%
ETPM 12.24% 30.15% 20.42% 9.07% 16.07% 17.11% 16.65% 12.67% 12.39% 10.67% 14.81% 20.49%
LPM 14.23% 37.41% 49.08% 80.91% 69.80% 86.96% 37.35% 50.11% 118.2% 43.57% 62.88% 36.76%
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Fig. 7. Performance evaluation of winning seller payments and bids in small problem size scenario.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Fig. 8. Performance evaluation of winning seller payments and bids in large problem size scenario.
achieves better UoS than the baseline methods that is close
to that of the optimal solutions. Notably, as an excessively
long time is needed to obtain the optimal solutions with an
increase in the number of buyers and sellers, performance
evaluation of the optimal algorithm is ignored in Fig. 5(g)
and Fig. 5(h).
For large problem sizes containing more buyers and sell-
ers, the comparisons of the sum of the buyers’ UoS between
the baseline methods, the optimal and the MaxUoSG algo-
rithms are shown in Fig. 6. Note that the performance eval-
uation of the optimal algorithm is not considered in Fig. 6
since the running time becomes prohibitively large when the
number of participants in the marketplace grows. As can be
seen from Fig. 6, the proposed MaxUoSG algorithm always
results in a better value of the objective function (3) rather
than that of RMM, ETPM and LPM, in various scenarios
considering different numbers of buyers and sellers. For a
better illustration, TABLE 2 is presented that describes the
average performance improvement revealed in Fig. 5 and
Fig. 6 upon utilizing the proposedMaxUoSG comparedwith
the baseline methods in various problem sizes.
5.4 The desired economical properties
Simulations related to the economical properties of truthful-
ness and individual rationality for the proposed MaxUoSG
algorithm considering different problem sizes are depicted
in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. Considering a small problem size case
with one graph job type 1 and one type 2 (totally 7 buyers)
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and 3 SPs (totally 25 sellers), the comparison between the
winning sellers payments and bids is depicted in Fig. 7(a).
As can be seen from this figure, each winning seller will
get a final payment no less than his bid, which is related
to the individual rationality property. Fig. 7(b)-Fig. 7(h)
exhibit both the untruthful and truthful bidding behaviors
of each winning seller, where the value of x-axis is defined
as the submitted bids and the red solid circles indicate the
truthful prices and the related payments. Specifically, Fig.
7(b), Fig. 7(f) and Fig. 7(g) show that misreporting behavior
in bidding will not lead to higher payments to the sellers,
which encourages them to behave truthfully. Sellers 2, 3,
4 and 22 in Fig. 7(c), Fig. 7(d), Fig. 7(e) and Fig. 7(h) are
facing with the risk of getting worse payments when misre-
porting in the auction. According to Case 2 in Proposition
5, misreporting behaviors may cause some changes to the
preference lists of the buyers and the broker, which may
result in a different buyer-seller pair selection owing to the
structure preservation constraint. Thus, sellers 2, 3, 4 and 22
in these figures may get chances to obtain better payments
when they are untruthful. However, non-transparent infor-
mation in the marketplace makes sellers unconsciousness of
arranging their bids to avoid potential risks. Thus, bidding
truthfully stands for a risk-free behavior. Take Fig. 7(e) as
an example, seller 4 will definitely get a worse payment
when bidding lower than his true price 0.6. Also, seller 4
is insensible of how to raise his bid for getting a better
payment before encountering the risk of non-payment after
bidding larger than 0.648. As a conclusion, sellers observe
the truthfulness property in our proposed framework.
Simulation results for large problem sizes considering
4 JOs (totally 19 buyers, including two graph job type 2,
one type 3 and one type 4) and 5 SPs (totally 48 sellers)
are presented in Fig. 8. Similar to Fig. 7(a), Fig. 8(a) shows
that the payment of each winning seller stays no less than
his bid, which makes all sellers individual rational. Sub-
sequently, seven winning sellers as repesentatives are ran-
domly chosen from 19 winning sellers to conduct payment
evaluation under untruthful and truthful behaviors. Fig.
8(b), Fig. 8(c) and Fig. 8(d) indicate that the sellers do not get
better payments when misreporting their bids. Moreover,
Fig. 8(e), Fig. 8(f), Fig. 8(g) and Fig. 8(h) reveal the risks that
the sellers may undergo when misreporting their bids in
the marketplace. Consequently, sellers are motivated to bid
truthfully in our proposed framework.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper studies a novel truthful auction-based graph job
allocation scheme for VC-assisted IoV, which is formulated
as an IP problem. For small problem sizes with a couple
of buyers and sellers, an optimal algorithm is introduced
along with a VCG-based payment rule. For large problem
sizes containing more participants and complicated job and
VC structures, a low computation complexity structure-
preserved matching algorithm based on UoSG maximiza-
tion, and the corresponding payment role are proposed. The
effectiveness of the proposed algorithms is revealed through
comprehensive simulations. Several potential future direc-
tions can be concerned such as considering the cooperation
among the SPs, and designing new payment rules to avoid
risks if possible.
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